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Pronoun reversals, saying you when meaning I, in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) are generally viewed as manifest in early development and speech production only. 
This study investigates pronoun reversals in later development (age 6-12) in interpretation in 
48 Dutch-speaking children with ASD and 43 typically developing (TD) peers. We 
contrasted children’s interpretation of I and you in indirect and direct speech reports, the 
latter type requiring an additional perspective shift. To examine which cognitive processes 
are involved in pronoun interpretation, additional tasks were administered to measure Theory 
of Mind (ToM) understanding, cognitive inhibition, cognitive flexibility and working 
memory. We found that children with ASD showed more problems than TD children 
interpreting pronouns in direct speech, resulting in pronoun reversals in interpretation. 
Children with ASD hardly improved with age. Older children with ASD thus showed more 
pronoun reversals than their TD peers. ToM understanding, working memory, IQ and verbal 
ability, but not inhibition and flexibility, were associated with pronoun interpretation. ToM 
understanding in particular was associated with correct pronoun interpretation in older TD 
children relative to younger TD children, but this improvement was not found in children 
with ASD. These findings indicate that pronoun reversals most likely result from perspective-
shifting difficulties. We conclude that pronoun reversals are more pronounced in individuals 
with ASD, occur beyond early development and require sufficient cognitive resources. The 
relation with ToM understanding, but not inhibition and flexibility, suggests that pronoun 
reversals are best classified as a social communication problem in the diagnosis of ASD. 
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General Scientific Summary 
Pronoun reversals are viewed as a characteristic of the early language use of children with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder. This study suggests that pronoun reversals also occur beyond 
early development and in interpretation, and result from listeners’ difficulties in shifting to 





Pronoun reversals, for example saying you when meaning I and vice versa, are a well-known 
early characteristic of the language and communication problems in children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Baltaxe, 1977; Tager-Flusberg, 1994). Research on pronoun 
reversals in children with ASD has mainly focused on pronoun use. The few studies on 
pronoun interpretation in children and adolescents with ASD (e.g., Hobson, Lee, & Hobson, 
2010; Jordan, 1989; Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994) found little or no evidence of errors in the 
interpretation of pronouns in simple sentences. In a study with adults, however, Mizuno et al. 
(2011) showed that, compared to an adult control group, adults with high-functioning ASD 
were slower and more error prone when they needed to shift perspectives to correctly 
interpret sentences containing I and you. This would suggest that pronoun reversals, including 
reversals in pronoun interpretation, are due to perspective-shifting difficulties and that these 
reversals are more extensive and longer-lasting in individuals with ASD than hitherto 
assumed. The present study therefore investigates pronoun interpretation in complex 
sentences that require perspective shifting by primary school-aged children diagnosed with 
ASD. 
Pronouns are extremely common in everyday speech, for instance when parents talk 
to their children (Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2003), emphasizing the 
importance of correct pronoun interpretation. Typically developing (TD) children have been 
found to correctly use and interpret the personal pronouns I, you and he/she before primary 
school-age (Brener, 1983; Chiat, 1986; Halliday, 1975). Pronoun reversals are documented in 
the speech of very young TD children, but these reversals do not persist (Lee et al., 1994). In 
children with ASD, pronoun reversals are also mostly viewed as manifest in early language 
development and persisting only in individuals with ASD with a low intelligence (i.e., “low-




Several explanations have been proposed for the pronoun reversals in the speech of 
young children with and without ASD. Kanner (1943) originally explained pronoun reversals 
in children with ASD as echolalia, or the repetition of speech (see also Bartak & Rutter, 
1974). This view is still present in the DSM-5, where the use of you when referring to self is 
mentioned as an illustration of repetitive speech (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2013; p. 54). Subsequent explanations refer to the linguistic, social or cognitive aspects 
involved in pronoun use that are supposed to be extra challenging for children with ASD. For 
example, according to the name hypothesis (Clark, 1978) children may assume that pronouns, 
like proper names, have a fixed reference. Hence, rather than shifting the reference of 
pronouns, these children consistently use you to refer to themselves and I to refer to others. 
Social or pragmatic explanations (e.g., Charney, 1980; Hobson, 1990; Hobson et al., 2010; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1996; Tager-Flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005) hold that children are limited in 
their representation of themselves in relation to others, or have difficulties understanding the 
different discourse roles in conversation. This results in pronoun reversals, as the correct use 
of I and you depends on who is the speaker and who is the addressee and shifts with a change 
in discourse roles. Cognitive or performance-based explanations (e.g., Dale & Crain-
Thoreson, 1993) hypothesize that children know that pronouns require a shift in perspective, 
but lack the cognitive resources needed for such perspective shifting. Based on this 
hypothesis, it is expected that perspective shifting more often fails in cognitively demanding 
or complex situations. Two recent studies have suggested that pronoun reversals are not 
caused by one single factor, but rather by the interaction between multiple factors in 
children’s development (Evans & Demuth, 2012; Naigles et al., 2016). Specifically, Naigles 
et al. (2016) suggest that children reverse pronouns due to an asynchronous development of 
their linguistic and social abilities, in particular when children’s linguistic abilities are ahead 




no consensus yet as to the explanation of pronoun reversals in production. Also, it is unclear 
whether the proposed explanations for pronoun reversals in production generate correct 
predictions for pronoun interpretation.  
Although most primary school-aged TD children have developed a full pronoun 
system, the interpretation of personal pronouns is still challenging for these children in 
situations that require an additional perspective shift. Such situations occur when talking 
about what other people have said. Suppose James says to me: “You won the prize!”. If I 
want to report this to my brother, I can use an indirect speech report or a direct speech report:  
 
(1a) Indirect speech report (uttered by me): James said that I won the prize. 
(1b) Direct speech report (uttered by me): James said, “You won the prize!”  
 
The pronoun I in (1a) and the pronoun you in (1b) both refer to me, the speaker of the 
utterance. To select the correct referent of you in (1b), the hearer needs to shift from the 
perspective of the actual speaker, me, to the perspective of the reported speaker, James 
(Köder, Maier, & Hendriks, 2015). If my brother fails to shift to the perspective of James, he 
will incorrectly interpret you in (1b) as referring to himself, the hearer, in the same way that 
you in an indirect speech report also refers to the hearer. The result is pronoun reversal in 
interpretation. Such pronoun reversals in interpretation have been studied in TD children and 
adults, but not in children with ASD. Köder and Maier (2016) found that primary school-aged 
TD children find it challenging to shift perspective to select the correct referent for pronouns 
in direct speech. Unlike adults, these children tended to interpret pronouns in direct speech as 
in indirect speech.  
The present study is the first to investigate how primary school-aged children 




primary school-aged children with ASD know that they have to shift perspective when 
interpreting the pronouns I and you, but experience more difficulties shifting perspective in 
complex situations. Thus, we expect all children to be adult-like in their interpretation of 
pronouns in indirect speech, which only requires one perspective shift from the listener to the 
actual speaker. In addition, we expect children with ASD to have more difficulties than their 
TD peers interpreting pronouns in direct speech, as direct speech requires an additional 
perspective shift from the actual speaker to the reported speaker. These expectations are in 
accordance with the cognitive explanation, the social explanation and the asynchronous 
development explanation, but do not follow from the repetitive speech explanation and the 
name hypothesis. The repetitive speech explanation would predict no difficulties at all in 
pronoun interpretation, whereas the name hypothesis would predict no differences in 
performance between pronouns in direct speech and indirect speech. To enhance our 
understanding of the difficulties involved in pronoun interpretation in direct speech, we 
additionally investigate the possible influence of four cognitive processes on pronoun 
interpretation. Firstly, primary school-aged children might need Theory of Mind (ToM) for 
pronoun interpretation. ToM is the ability to mentally take the perspective of other people to 
understand their beliefs, desires and intentions (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). We hypothesize 
that hearers need ToM to make the additional perspective shift from the actual speaker to the 
reported speaker.  
In addition to ToM, other cognitive processes, like working memory, inhibition and 
flexibility, could be needed in pronoun interpretation. These executive functioning processes 
allow for the flexible alteration of thought and behaviour in response to changing contexts 
(Welsh & Pennington, 1988). The hearer may need cognitive inhibition, which is the 
efficiency with which one can suppress irrelevant information (Dagenbach & Carr, 1994), to 




speaker’s perspective (Köder et al., 2015). In addition, to shift to the reported speaker’s 
perspective, the hearer may need cognitive flexibility, which is the mental ability to shift 
between different thoughts or actions (Scott, 1962). Finally, working memory (WM), which is 
the capacity to actively maintain information for short periods of time (Baddeley, 1986), 
could be needed. A hearer with low WM capacity may be unable to keep the reported 
speaker’s perspective in mind and thus interpret the pronoun from the reported speaker’s 
perspective. All four cognitive processes have been argued to be impaired in individuals with 
ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Christ, Kester, Bodner, & Miles, 2011; De Vries 
& Geurts, 2012; Geurts & Vissers, 2012; Hill, 2004), which could explain why children with 






Forty-eight children with ASD and 43 TD children were tested. All children in the ASD 
group were diagnosed with ASD by clinicians on the basis of the DSM-IV-TR criteria (APA, 
2000). Additionally, the Autism Diagnostic Interview Revised (ADI-R; Rutter, Le Couteur, 
& Lord, 2003) and the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, 
DiLavore, & Risi, 1999) were administered by certified professionals. Two children from the 
ASD group (both clinically diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not 
Otherwise Specified) were excluded because they met neither the ADOS nor the ADI-R 
criteria for ASD (cf. the ASD2 criteria of Risi et al., 2006). One child from the TD group met 
the ADOS criteria for autism and was therefore excluded, leaving 46 children with ASD 




When recruiting the children with ASD and the TD children, only mono-lingual 
Dutch-speaking children with no diagnosis of any language disorder were included. IQ scores 
on a clinically administered full IQ test were used to include only children with ASD with an 
IQ score of >75 in our sample. We expected all TD children in our sample to have an IQ of 
>75, since all of them went to regular primary schools and none had reported learning 
difficulties. Because we wanted to compare the IQ scores of all participants, we additionally 
estimated each child’s IQ using two subtests (Vocabulary and Block Design) of the WISC-
III-NL (Kort et al., 2002). We also derived a normed verbal ability (VA) quotient from the 
standardized Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-III-NL; Schlichting, 2005) to assess 
children’s VA. The background data of the two groups of participants with group means and 
standard deviations for age, estimated IQ and VA can be found in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Children with ASD and their parents were recruited via outpatient clinics for child and 
adolescent psychiatry in the north of the Netherlands and a national website for parents who 
have a child with ASD. TD children were recruited via information in newsletters and 
brochures at schools in the north of the Netherlands. Children were tested individually on a 
single day in a quiet room with two experimenters present. All children participated in a 
larger study on language and communication in ASD. The medical ethical committee of the 
University Medical Hospital Groningen evaluated this study as not falling under the Medical 
Research Involving Human Subjects Act (WMO). Nevertheless, we followed the required 





Pronoun comprehension task 
Participants watched short movies where 3 animals were playing a game in which one animal 
decided who was going to get a particular object. First, the animals (hand puppets of a dog, 
pig and frog) and 6 objects (e.g., ball, car, glasses) were introduced on the computer screen. 
For each animal, a different male voice was used, to make it easier for the participant to 
identify the speaker. Furthermore, three practice items were administered to check whether 
the participant understood the task. 
Each participant first received a pretest, consisting of 15 simple statements with either 
a first, second or third person singular pronoun (ik ‘I’, jij ‘you’ or hij ‘he’), to check their 
understanding of personal pronouns in simple statements. Third person pronouns were added 
to avoid that participants could simply choose the speaker as the referent of I and the 
remaining referent as the referent of you. In each item, a movie showed one animal (the 
speaker) telling another animal (the hearer) who was going to get the object. A third animal 
(the non-participant) stood further away facing the other direction. After the movie a voice-
over asked the question who got the object. The participant pressed one of three buttons to 
select the answer. See Figure 1 for an example item. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Next, the speech report task was presented, consisting of 15 direct speech items (test 
condition) and 15 indirect speech items (control condition) with either the personal pronoun 
ik ‘I’, jij ‘you’ or hij ‘he’ (5 items per pronoun per condition). These items were randomized 
in two blocks with a short break in between. Similar to the procedure in the pretest, each item 
consisted of a movie in which one animal (the actual speaker) is telling another animal (the 




answer. Figure 2 shows an example item in the direct speech condition and in the indirect 
speech condition.  
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
In this example item, Pig whispers into Frog’s ear who will get the car. The 
participant only hears unintelligible whispering. Then, Frog tells Dog what Pig has said using 
a direct or indirect speech construction. After the short movie, the voice-over asks the 
question: Who gets the car? The participant presses one of three buttons to select which of the 
three animals will get the car. The selected answer is highlighted by a colored frame.  
In Dutch, the direct and indirect speech sentences differ from each other. Direct 
speech sentences have verb-second word order, while indirect speech sentences have verb-
final word order and include the complementizer dat ‘that’. Note that the indirect he items 
(Pig said that he gets the car) are special in that the pronoun he can also refer back to the 
subject of the clause (the reported speaker), instead of referring to the non-participant in the 
movie directly (for more details, see Köder & Maier, 2016; Köder et al., 2015). 
 The roles (speaker, hearer, non-participant), pronouns (I, you, he), speech types 
(direct, indirect), and the used objects were counterbalanced, resulting in six different lists. 
Stimuli were presented and data recorded using the computer software E-Prime 2.0 
(Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002). The experiment took approximately 25 minutes. 
 
Cognitive processes 
ToM. The Bake Sales task, a False Belief (FB) Task adopted from Hollebrandse, van 
Hout and Hendriks (2014), was used to test ToM. Their stories were modelled after Perner 




which contained a first-order FB question (involving the belief of one other person) and a 
second-order FB question (involving the belief of another person about a third person). The 
task was conducted with the computer software E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider et al., 2002). The 
measures of ToM1 and ToM2 were calculated using the mean accuracy (ACC) on the eight 
first-order FB questions and second-order FB questions, respectively.  
Cognitive inhibition. In the Flanker test (Amsterdam Neuropsychological Test battery 
(ANT) version 2.1; De Sonneville, 1999) participants had to identify the colour of a target 
stimulus that was surrounded by eight distracters (flankers). The target colour was associated 
with the left (red) or right (green) button. The flankers were in the same colour as the target 
(compatible) or in the colour that was associated with the opposite response of the target 
(incompatible). The participant received 40 compatible and 40 incompatible items. The mean 
ACC and mean reaction time (RT) of cognitive inhibition was measured by subtracting the 
mean ACC or RT on compatible trials from the mean ACC and RT on incompatible trials 
(resulting in the congruency effect; see Mullane, Corkum, Klein, & McLaughlin, 2009). 
Cognitive flexibility task. To test cognitive flexibility, a classical switch task was used 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This task is an adaptation of the gender-emotion switch task (De 
Vries & Geurts, 2012). Pictures of round or square figures, in black or white, were displayed 
on the computer screen. Participants had to press the left or right button of a button box to 
report the shape (round or square) or the colour (black or white) of the figure. The cue at the 
top indicated if the shape or colour had to be reported. The test part consisted of 216 trials. 
One-third of these trials were switch trials (switching from colour to shape or vice versa). 
Stimuli were presented and data recorded using the computer software Presentation (version 
16.3; Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc). The mean ACC and mean RT of switch costs was 
measured by subtracting the mean ACC or RT on repeat trials from the mean ACC and RT 




Working Memory. In the N-Back task (Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005) 
participants had to remember pictures presented on a screen and indicate per picture if that 
picture matched the picture of the current trial or the picture of one or two trials before. Three 
conditions were administered: the 0-back (baseline: is the current picture a car or not?), 1-
back and 2-back. Each participant received a practice session of 15 trials per condition. The 
test session consisted of 60 trials per condition. Stimuli were presented and data recorded 
using the computer software E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider et al., 2002). The mean ACC on the 2-




The results of the pronoun comprehension pretest confirmed that pronoun interpretation in 
simple statements is intact in both groups. Likewise, our findings indicated that the two 
groups have no problems interpreting pronouns in indirect speech, as hypothesized 
(additional data are given in Online Resource 1). 
To answer our research questions, we focused on the direct speech condition. The 
outcome variable of this condition was coded binary (0 for incorrect, 1 for correct). 
Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) are designed for binomially distributed 
outcomes (Jaeger, 2008; p.442). Also, GLMMs do not require prior aggregation into 
proportions, as the aim is to provide estimates of the likelihood of a success (or failure) for 
each individual observational unit (Baayen, 2012; p.675). Therefore, the data of the direct 
speech condition were analyzed using GLMM analyses in IBM SPSS Statistics 23, using a 
logit link to accommodate the repeatedly measured binary outcome variable Accuracy (cf. 
Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2012; Jaeger, 2008). Compound symmetry was used as covariance 




baseline, resulting in Pronoun1 (he vs. I) and Pronoun2 (he vs. you). The possible presence of 
I vs. you differences were subsequently checked through shifting the reference category. Age 
was mean-centered and additionally included in the model. Interactions with no effect on 
Accuracy (p > .05) were removed from the model one by one, choosing the largest p-value 
for removal, after which we refitted the model. This resulted in model 1, which shows 
whether difficulties in pronoun interpretation in direct speech are more pronounced in 
children with ASD than in TD children. For purposes of interpreting the interaction effects, 
we illustrated the significant interaction effects using the median split method.  
Next, all relevant parameters derived from the ToM task (ToM1 and ToM2), Flanker 
task (Cognitive inhibition ACC and Cognitive inhibition RT), cognitive flexibility task 
(Switch costs ACC and Switch costs RT) and N-Back task (WM) were mean-centered around 
a value of zero. These cognitive processes were examined as main effects and in interaction 
with the significant predictors from model 1 in seven separate analyses. In each analysis, the 
cognitive process was included as a predictor. The data of 3 participants (2 ASD and 1 TD) 
were missing in the Cognitive inhibition ACC and RT analyses, leaving the data of 44 ASD 
and 41 TD participants. Based on the outcomes of these analyses per predictor, we combined 
the cognitive processes with (main or interaction) effects on Accuracy (p <.05) and added 
these with the significant predictors of model 1 in a model with multiple predictors to 
evaluate their effects adjusted for one another (cf. Kuijper, Hartman, & Hendriks, 2015). This 
resulted in model 2, which shows the relevant cognitive processes that had an effect on the 
interpretation of pronouns in direct speech and explained possible Group differences.  
Finally, the relevant parameters derived from the PPVT (VA) and WISC (estimated 
IQ) were included in two separate analyses as fixed factors to model 1. These general 
background variables were added to the model to check whether these variables changed 




these variables had an effect on Accuracy (p <.05), they were added to model 2 and evaluated 
in model 3. Given the significant group differences (see Table 1) in estimated IQ (B=-12.94; 
SE=3.29; p<.001) and VA (B=-8.85; SE=2.69; p<.01), this approach provides a statistical 




Model 1 showed a main effect of Age and interactions of Group*Pronoun2 and Group*Age 
(see Table 2). 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
The Group*Pronoun2 interaction (p=.02; see Table 2) found in model 1 is plotted in Figure 3. 
This figure shows that the ASD group had a lower Accuracy than the TD group with the 
pronoun you vs. he.  
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
In Figure 4, the Group*Age interaction (p=.04; see Table 2) found in model 1 is 
plotted. We used the median split method to plot Accuracy of pronoun interpretation per age 
group (Young: ≤111 months old vs. Old: >111 months old) to illustrate how the interaction 
effect took form. Figure 4 shows that older TD children, but not older children with ASD, 






 [Insert Figure 4] 
 
We have subsequently checked in model 1 the presence of I vs. you differences. No I 
vs. you differences were found (p-values >.05; see Table 2). Also, no differences were found 
between the type of errors made by children with ASD and their TD peers. An error analysis 
showed that in 98% of the errors in the direct speech condition, children selected the indirect 
speech referent. 
Next, we examined, one by one, which cognitive processes were associated with 
Accuracy. All significant interactions and main effects of these analyses per predictor (see 
Online Resource 1) were combined in model 2 along with the effects identified in model 1. 
Table 2 lists all remaining effects in model 2. 
With respect to Group differences, model 2 included interactions of 
ToM2*Group*Pronoun1 and ToM2*Group*Pronoun2 (p-values <.05; see Table 2). These 
interactions are plotted in Figure 5. The median split method is used to plot Accuracy of 
pronoun interpretation per ToM2 group (low ToM2: ≤.75 vs. high ToM2: >.75) to illustrate 
the direction of the interaction effect. The mean ToM2 scores in the figure caption provide 
background information about the ToM performance of each specific group. As is shown in 
Figure 5, ASD children with low second-order ToM understanding performed worse with I 
vs. he (p=.01; see Table 2) and you vs. he (p=.02; see Table 2) than TD children with low 
second-order ToM understanding. 
 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
Model 2 additionally included a significant interaction of ToM2*Group*Age (p=.02; 




ToM2 group (low ToM2: ≤.75 vs. high ToM2: >.75) is plotted. The mean ToM2 scores in the 
figure caption provide background information about the ToM performance of each specific 
group. The older ASD children performed similar to the younger ASD children. As is shown 
in Figure 6, second-order ToM understanding had a larger effect on pronoun interpretation in 
older TD children than in older ASD children.  
 
 [Insert Figure 6] 
 
Model 2 further showed interactions of WM*Pronoun1 and WM*Pronoun2 (p-values 
< .05; see Table 2), indicating that in general children with a lower WM had more problems 
interpreting pronouns in direct speech (see Online Resource 1). 
 Finally, in model 3 we checked if the effects of the background variables IQ and VA 
on the interpretation of pronouns, first separately and then combined, altered findings in 
model 2 (additional data are given in Online Resource 2). The results of model 3 showed that 
with the addition of IQ and VA, the effects in model 2 were highly similar, with a slightly 
reduced effect of ToM*Group*Pronoun2. This indicates that the associations of WM and 
ToM understanding with pronoun interpretation remained after taking into account the group 
differences and individual differences in IQ and VA. Model 3 additionally showed an 
interaction effect of IQ*Pronoun2 (p=.01; see Table 2), indicating that in general children 
with a lower IQ had more problems interpreting you and he in direct speech. Also, an 
interaction of VA*Age (p=.02; see Table 2) was found, indicating that not only young 
children, but also older children with low verbal abilities had problems interpreting pronouns 
in direct speech (see Online Resource 2). Table 2 lists all effects in model 3. 
It should be noted that the interactions of Group*Pronoun1 and Group*Pronoun2 




fully explain why children with ASD showed more problems than their TD peers with the 
interpretation of I and you in direct speech. However, with the addition of these cognitive 




We investigated the interpretation of the personal pronouns I and you in perspective-shifting 
situations created by direct speech reports in primary school-aged children with and without 
ASD. Summarizing our findings, we found that 1) all children, both with and without ASD, 
had problems with the interpretation of pronouns in direct speech, but not with the 
interpretation of pronouns in indirect speech, and 2) children with ASD had more problems 
than their TD peers interpreting pronouns in direct speech. Also, we found that 3) all 
children, but especially the TD children, made fewer errors in direct speech when they were 
older. Compared to older TD children, older children with ASD had thus more problems 
interpreting pronouns in perspective-shifting situations. Our cognitive processes analysis 
showed that 4) a better WM and 5) a better second-order ToM understanding were associated 
with better pronoun understanding in direct speech. Especially children with ASD with a low 
second-order ToM understanding made more errors than their TD peers interpreting I and you 
compared to he in direct speech. Considering age, 6) a better second-order ToM 
understanding was associated with better pronoun understanding in older compared to 
younger TD children, while this was not the case for pronoun understanding in children with 
ASD. Considering the background variables of VA and IQ, we found that 7) like young 
children in general, older children with low verbal abilities had more problems interpreting 




associated with better pronoun understanding in direct speech. Finally, no effects of cognitive 
inhibition and cognitive flexibility were found. 
The first aim of this study was to find out whether primary school-aged children 
diagnosed with ASD experience more difficulties than their TD peers interpreting pronouns 
in direct speech. As expected, we found that primary school-aged children with and without 
ASD are adult-like in their interpretation of the pronouns I and you in indirect speech, but 
have difficulties interpreting these pronouns in direct speech. Like Köder and Maier (2016), 
we found that children who have difficulties interpreting pronouns in direct speech interpret 
these pronouns as in indirect speech. That is, they incorrectly interpret pronouns in direct 
speech from the perspective of the actual speaker instead of the reported speaker. This 
indicates that primary school-aged children have difficulty making the additional perspective 
shift from the actual speaker’s perspective to the reported speaker’s perspective, which is 
needed to correctly interpret pronouns in direct speech. Failing to make this additional 
perspective shift, they interpret I as you and you as I, resulting in pronoun reversals in 
interpretation.  
 Köder and Maier (2016) showed that primary school-aged TD children do not yet 
interpret pronouns in direct speech at an adult level. This indicates a relative late acquisition 
of pronoun interpretation in perspective-shifting situations in TD children. Our study is the 
first to show that pronoun interpretation in linguistic contexts requiring an additional 
perspective shift is even more challenging for primary school-aged children with ASD than 
for their TD peers. As expected, children with ASD showed more pronoun reversals in 
interpretation than their TD peers, especially with the pronoun you. Possibly, children with 
ASD, like TD children, find it easier to interpret I than you in direct speech because the 
referent of I is explicitly mentioned in the reporting clause (Köder & Maier, 2016; Köder et 




pronoun reversals in interpretation. It probably takes primary school-aged children with ASD 
longer than their TD peers to develop a good understanding of pronouns in perspective-
shifting situations. The prevalent view is that pronoun reversals only persist in the speech of 
young children with ASD and low intelligence (Baltaxe, 1977; Tager-Flusberg, 1994), but 
disappear in young children with an average intelligence (so-called “high-functioning” ASD). 
Our study provides evidence that pronoun reversals in children with ASD, in the more subtle 
interpretational form, are not only present in early development or in individuals with low 
intelligence, but persist in later development and in individuals of average intelligence.  
A second aim of this study was to shed more light on potential explanations of 
pronoun reversals. Below, we relate our findings on the pronoun comprehension task and the 
cognitive tasks to the various explanations proposed in the literature. In line with cognitive 
explanations of pronoun reversals (e.g., Dale & Crain-Thoreson, 1993), we found that the 
correct interpretation of pronouns in direct speech requires sufficient cognitive resources. A 
better WM and a higher IQ, which are argued to be strongly related to each other (Ackerman, 
Beier, & Boyle, 2005), help children with ASD as well as TD children in their understanding 
of pronouns.  
Furthermore, our results suggest that social abilities are involved in the interpretation 
of pronouns in direct speech, in particular ToM understanding. Children with ASD and TD 
children were found to show a better understanding of pronouns in direct speech when they 
have a better second-order ToM understanding. This finding is in line with social 
explanations of pronoun reversals (e.g., Charney, 1980; Hobson, 1990; Hobson et al., 2010; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1996) as well as with the asynchronous development explanation (e.g., 
Evans & Demuth, 2012; Naigles et al., 2016). Naigles et al. (2016) showed that toddlers with 
ASD with a larger vocabulary and with better joint attention skills, which is seen as an 




produced fewer pronoun reversals. Similarly, we found that primary school-aged children 
with ASD with sufficient linguistic abilities and better social abilities, namely better ToM 
understanding, show fewer pronoun reversals. In particular, second-order ToM understanding 
seems to enhance pronoun interpretation in older TD children compared to younger TD 
children, while we did not observe this improvement in children with ASD. This could 
indicate that pronoun reversals occur when children’s social abilities lag behind their 
linguistic abilities and derive from social immaturity (cf. Naigles et al., 2016).  
The suggestion that social abilities, in particular sufficient ToM understanding, are a 
prerequisite for the mature use and interpretation of personal pronouns, is also corroborated 
by the study of Durrleman and Delage (2016). Durrleman and Delage (2016) found a relation 
between first-order ToM understanding and the production of first-person accusative clitic 
pronouns in French-speaking children with ASD (aged 5-16). Our interpretation results are 
parallel to their production results, as we found that especially children with ASD with low 
ToM understanding have problems interpreting first-person and second-person (nominative 
full) pronouns in direct speech. The relation we found with second-order ToM understanding 
in particular is indicative of problems with shifting perspective twice. Like in second-order 
ToM understanding, two shifts are needed to correctly interpret pronouns in direct speech: 
first, the listener must shift to the perspective of the actual speaker; next, in order to interpret 
the direct speech report, the listener needs to shift to the perspective of the reported speaker. 
The interpretation of the pronouns I and you can thus be seen as indicators of (un)successful 
perspective shifting. 
According to the asynchronous development explanation (e.g., Naigles et al., 2016), 
pronoun reversals may also derive from linguistic immaturity. However, we did not find 
support for this view. Linguistically immature children with ASD might have difficulty with 




with the name hypothesis, cf. Clark, 1978). If so, we would have found no difference in 
performance between pronoun interpretation in direct and indirect speech, as under this view 
pronouns are predicted to have a fixed reference across different contexts. However, we 
found that children with and without ASD performed almost at ceiling with pronouns in 
indirect speech, while making a substantial number of errors with pronouns in direct speech. 
Furthermore, we found that all children who made pronoun reversals in direct speech 
predominantly chose the indirect speech referent, suggesting that all of these children had 
problems making the second shift in perspective.  
Our findings also do not lend support to the repetitive speech explanation (i.e., 
Kanner’s view of pronoun reversals, see Kanner, 1943). This account predicts that pronoun 
reversals should not occur in interpretation. We found, however, that children do show 
pronoun reversals in interpretation. Moreover, restricted, repetitive behaviours in ASD, 
including repetitive speech (echolalia), have been found to be related to executive functioning 
impairments such as reduced cognitive flexibility and inhibition problems (Miller, 
Ragozzino, Cook, Sweeney, & Mosconi, 2015; Mosconi et al., 2009). The absence of a 
relation between pronoun interpretation and cognitive inhibition or cognitive flexibility in our 
study corroborates our conclusion that pronoun reversals should not be approached as 
repetitive speech forms. This suggests that in the clinical diagnosis of ASD pronoun reversals 
are better approached as a social communication problem rather than a restricted, repetitive 
pattern of behavior like echolalia (see DSM-5; APA, 2013).  
The effects of ToM, WM, IQ and VA on pronoun interpretation could not fully 
explain why children with ASD had more problems than TD children interpreting I and you 
in direct speech (i.e., the group difference remained significant in our models 2 and 3). This 
suggests that additional processes are at work here. Köder et al. (2015) point out that, in the 




cues such as a greater overall pitch range. While some studies report intact syntactic and 
prosodic skills in individuals with ASD (Diehl, Friedberg, Paul, & Snedeker, 2015; Janke & 
Perovic, 2015), other studies suggest that individuals with ASD have problems with syntactic 
dependencies in questions and relative clauses and prosodic cues signaling discourse 
prominence (Durrleman, Hippolyte, Zufferey, Iglesias, & Hadjikhani, 2015; McCann & 
Peppé, 2003; Terzi, Marinis, & Francis, 2016). If children with ASD indeed struggle with 
syntactic dependencies and prosodic cues, they may be less sensitive to the syntactic and 
prosodic cues that signal direct speech. Also, it has been argued that syntactic skills are 
needed for ToM understanding (De Villiers, 2007; De Villiers, Hobbs, & Hollebrandse, 2014; 
De Villiers & Pyers, 2002), especially in children with ASD (Durrleman et al., 2016; Lind & 
Bowler, 2009). It could be argued that problems with pronoun interpretation in direct speech 
in children with ASD reflect difficulties with syntactic components of language rather than 
perspective-taking difficulties. However, the children with ASD in our study did not have 
problems interpreting indirect speech reports, which consist of a complement clause 
introduced by a verb of communication (e.g., ‘Pig said that I get the car’). This shows that 
they have at least some understanding of complex syntactic structures. Future studies could 
explore the relation between syntactic skills and ToM understanding in the development of 
pronoun interpretation in reported speech. 
An important limitation of the current study is that our cross-sectional design does not 
allow us to make firm statements about the longitudinal development of pronoun reversals in 
children with and without ASD. It is conceivable that other factors, for example linguistic 
factors, play a role in pronoun reversals in early development than the factors that we found 
to be relevant in later development. Future studies could examine pronoun production and 
interpretation in combination with linguistic, social and cognitive abilities in children with 




of pronoun reversals and will help to determine which factors play a role in which 
developmental stage. Another limitation is the generalizability of our study, since our sample 
includes a high proportion of children with the milder form of ASD (i.e., PDD-NOS, a 
subcategory of ASD in the DSM-IV (APA, 2000)). Furthermore, since we found differences 
between children with ASD and TD children in our study, we expect any problems with 
pronoun interpretation that are linked to the severity of autistic symptoms to be even larger in 
a sample containing more children with severe autistic symptoms. The use of severity levels 
of ASD in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) may help to determine whether the level of severity of 
ASD is related to the amount of pronoun reversals in interpretation. 
In sum, we draw the following three conclusions. First, our study shows that children 
with ASD aged 6 to 12 have problems interpreting I and you in direct speech, resulting in 
pronoun reversals in interpretation. Therefore, such pronoun reversals do not only occur in 
early development of children with ASD, as suggested by the literature, but in their later 
development as well. Second, like in the production of pronouns, where reversals are more 
extensive and longer-lasting in children with ASD than in TD children, our data suggest that 
also in the interpretation of pronouns children with ASD lag behind their TD peers. Third, 
based on the associations with ToM understanding, our results suggest that pronoun reversals  
most likely result from perspective-shifting difficulties. Cognitive inhibition and flexibility, 
which are both associated with repetitive behavior, are not needed for better pronoun 
interpretation. We therefore propose that in the clinical diagnosis of ASD, pronoun reversals 
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Table 1. Description of participants with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and typically 
developing (TD) participants 




Gender (boys:girls) 39:7 34:8 n.s. 









Clinical diagnosis of ASD subtype 

















Number of participants meeting 
ASD2 criteria b on: 
ADOS and ADI 
ADOS only 
ADI only 






















Estimated IQ (WISC) c 
Mean (SD) 
Range 





TD > ASD*** 
 








TD > ASD** 
 
Note.  a PDD-NOS: Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified; b The ASD2 
criteria of Risi et al. (2006) are: “a child meets criteria on Social and Communication 
domains or meets criteria on Social and within 2 points of Communication criteria or meets 
criteria on Communication and within 2 points of Social criteria or within 1 point on both 
Social and Communication domains” (Risi et al., 2006; p.1100) c Estimated IQ on the basis 
of two subtests of the Dutch version of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-
III-NL; Kort et al., 2002); d  Normed verbal ability score from the Dutch version of the 




Table 2. Estimated effects of models 1, 2 and 3 on pronoun interpretation in direct speech 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Estimate SE p Estimate SE p Estimate SE p 
Intercept -1.10 0.32 .00** -1.84 0.52 .00** -1.72 0.44 .00** 
Group -0.04 0.43 .93 0.91 0.65 .17 0.84 0.59 .17 
Age 0.04 0.01 .01* -0.0 0.02 .87 -0.0 0.02 .85 
Pronoun1 0.27 0.22 .22 0.35 0.31 .26 0.32 0.34 .34 
Pronoun2 0.03 0.21 .89 -0.05 0.26 .84 -0.33 0.27 .22 
Group*Pronoun1 -0.58 0.35 .10 -0.93 0.41 .02* -0.94 0.43 .03* 
Group*Pronoun2 -0.76 0.31 .02* -0.99 0.35 .01* -0.81 0.35 .02* 
Group*Age -0.03 0.02 .04* 0.0 0.02 .86 0.01 0.02 .54 
ToM1  -1.43 1.91 .46 -0.37 1.76 .83 
ToM2 3.7 1.45 .01* 3.24 1.31 .01* 
WM 1.67 2.37 .48 1.93 2.14 .37 
ToM2*Group -2.8 1.91 .15 -2.33 1.7 .17 
ToM2*Pronoun1 -1.37 0.95 .15 -1.34 0.98 .17 
ToM2*Pronoun2 -0.48 0.75 .52 -0.67 0.7 .34 
ToM2*Age 0.08 0.04 .046* 0.04 0.05 .35 
WM*Pronoun1 2.59 1.2 .03* 2.7 1.38 .05 
WM*Pronoun2 2.31 1.1 .04* 3.06 1.23 .01* 
ToM2*Group*Pronoun1 3.56 1.41 .01* 3.61 1.54 .02* 
ToM2*Group*Pronoun2 2.45 1.07 .02* 2.1 1.13 .06 
ToM2*Group*Age -0.17 0.07 .02* -0.14 0.06 .01* 
IQ  0.02 0.02 .29 




Verbal ability*Age 0.0 0.0 .02* 
IQ*Pronoun1 0.0 0.0 .88 
IQ*Pronoun2 0.03 0.01 .01* 
* p=<.05; **p=<.01;  
Note. Pronoun1 is he vs. I and Pronoun2 is he vs. you. Analyses in model 1 with reference 
category shifting (I is baseline) showed no I vs. you differences: Group*Pronoun1 (I vs. you) 







Frog tells Dog:  
Jij krijgt de auto. 
“You get the car” 
Question of voice over: 
Wie krijgt de auto? 
“Who gets the car?” 
Selected answer is highlighted 
by colored frame. 
 





  Pig whispers in Frog’s ear. 
  Pig and Dog switch   
  positions. 
Frog reports to Dog in direct 
speech:  
Varken zei: ‘Jij krijgt de auto’ 
“Pig said: ‘You get the car’ ”   
Selected answer is 




or indirect speech:  
Varken zei dat hij de auto krijgt. 
“Pig said that I get the car.” 
 
Question of voice over:  
Wie krijgt de auto? 
“Who gets the car?” 
 
Fig. 2 Story board with a direct speech and an indirect speech example including the original 




Fig. 3 Accuracy of pronoun interpretation in direct speech per group (TD vs. ASD) plotted 






Fig. 4 Accuracy of pronoun interpretation in direct speech per group (TD vs. ASD) plotted 






Fig. 5 Accuracy of pronoun interpretation in direct speech per group (TD vs. ASD) and 
ToM2 group (low ToM: ≤ median vs. high ToM: > median; median=.75) plotted per pronoun 
(ik ‘I’, jij ‘you’, hij ‘he’) Background information: The mean ToM2 scores per plotted group 
are: TD with low ToM2: .41; TD with high ToM2: .95; ASD with low ToM2: .37; ASD with 








Fig. 6 Accuracy of pronoun interpretation in direct speech per age group (Young: ≤112 m/o 
vs. Old: >112 m/o) and group (TD vs. ASD) plotted per ToM2 group (low ToM: ≤ median 
vs. high ToM: > median; median=.75). Background information: The mean ToM2 scores per 
plotted group are: TD-young-low ToM2: .34; TD-young-high ToM2: .94; ASD-young-low 
ToM2: .27; ASD-young-high ToM2: .92; TD-old-low ToM2: .55; TD-old-high ToM2: .96; 
ASD-old-low ToM2: .49; ASD-old-high ToM2: .94). 
 
 
